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I. INTRODUCTION
In June 1982 the Supreme Court in Edgar v. MITE Corp.' declared the Illinois
Business Take-Over Act2 unconstitutional. This action called into question the valid-
ity of all state takeover statutes. The securities community had expected the Court to
base its opinion on a finding that the Williams Act preempted state regulation in the
area of tender offers. 4 The Court held, however, that the Illinois Act constituted an
impermissible burden on interstate commerce because its effect could be to delay
indefinitely or completely stop a pending tender offer. 5
The Ohio General Assembly, the first state legislature to react,6 enacted the
1. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
2. Public Act 80-1421, 1978 Ill. Laws 1581, repealed by Act of Sept. 14, 1983, Public Act 83-365, 1983 Ill.
Legis. Serv. 2628.
3. For example, in Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 547 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Va. 1982), decided three months after
MITE, the court held that the Virginia Take-Over Bid Disclosure Act directly and indirectly violated the commerce clause.
The Virginia statute, like the Illinois Act held unconstitutional in MITE, applied to any open market purchases, regardless
of where the transaction took place and whether it affected a single in-state shareholder. Id. at 799. Approximately 37
states have statutes regulating tender offers. For a thorough discussion of state tender offer legislation see Ryndak, State
Takeover Statutes Under Attack-Casualties in the Battle for Corporate Control-MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 30 DE PAUL L.
REv. 989, 992-99 (1981).
4. The Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982), added §§ 13(d)-(e) and 14(d)-(f) to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Tender offer will be used interehangeably with takeover offer or bid in this Note. A
tender offer is generally defined as an invitation or solicitation by a company. an individual, or a group of shareholders of
a corporation to buy shares of a company, usually at a price above the market price. Those accepting the offer are said to
tender their stock for purchase. The offeror is typically obligated to purchase a specified portion of the tendered shares if
certain conditions are met. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967).
5. 457 U.S. 624, 640 (1982). The primary basis for finding state takeover statutes unconstitutional prior to MITE
was that they were preempted by the Williams Act, not that they violated the commerce clause. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 119-43 for a discussion of the pre-MITE preemption cases.
6. Since November 1982 at least seven states have enacted new legislation regulating takeovers. The Missouri and
Wisconsin legislation, and part of the Minnesota legislation, are clearly modeled after the Ohio Act. See 1984 Mo. Legis.
Serv. S.B. No. 409 (Vernon); 1983-85 Wis. Legis. Serv. 1983 Wis. Act 200 (West); Minnesota Business Corporation
Act, MINN. STAT. §§ 302A.01 1 subd. 37-39, 302A.449 subd. 7. 302A.671 (West Special Pamphlet 1985). The new
Kentucky, Maryland, and Michigan statutes, like the Ohio Act, are part of those states' general corporation laws. These
statutes, similar in their approach, regulate all "'business transactions" of a corporation and are directed primarily at the
second stage of a takeover. See KY. REv. STAT. § 271A.396-.400, .405 (Supp. 1984); MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE
ANN. § 3-601 to 3-603 (Supp. 1984-1985); 1984 Mich. Legis. Serv. Pub. Act No. 115 (West). The Pennsylvania Act is
also a part of that state's general corporation law and is applicable to all business combinations, but goes even further to
protect against takeovers. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1408, 1409.1, 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985). It has been
criticized as making it a practica" impossibility to effect a merger or liquidation into an affiliate and as containing an
overkill provision favoring the target corporation's management. See Sell, A Critical Analysis of a New Approach to State
Takeover Legislation After MITE, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 473, 483 (1983-1984). Only Minnesota has amended its existing
take-over act, which is fashioned after the act declared unconstitutional in MITE. Minnesota's Amended Take-Over Act,
Act of April 25, 1984, 1984 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 488 (West), applies to any offer to acquire from any Minnesota
resident publicly traded shares if at least 20% of the shares are held by Minnesota residents, when the acquisition would
result in ownership of at least 10% of the company or would result in an increase in ownership of more than 5% of the
company. While its jurisdictional requirement insulates the Act from the criticism that could conceivably operate to halt a
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Ohio Control Share Acquisition Act? to avoid the wake of MITE. Ohio adopted the
Act in November 1982 as part of its General Corporation Law. 8 While the con-
stitutionality of the Ohio statute has yet to be litigated, 9 this Note asserts that the Ohio
Legislature successfully avoided the unconstitutional elements found in the Illinois
statute and its prototypes. To establish this proposition, the MITE decision will first
be analyzed in detail. Second, the relevant provisions of both the Ohio Control Share
Acquisition Act and the Illinois Business Take-Over Act will be discussed. Last, the
constitutionality of the Ohio Control Share Acquisition Act will be scrutinized under
both preemption and commerce clause analyses. 10
II. EDGAR V. MITE CORP.: THE DECISION
A. Facts
Edgar v. MITE Corp.1 ' arose out of a hostile cash tender offer made by MITE, a
Delaware corporation, for all the outstanding shares of Chicago Rivet and Machine
Company. 12 At the commencement of the tender offer on January 19, 1979, Chicago
Rivet and Machine was an Illinois corporation with twenty-seven percent of its
shareholders residing in Illinois. 13
At the onset of its tender offer MITE filed a Schedule 14D-1 14 with the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in Washington, in full compliance with the
informational requirements of the Williams Act."5 However, MITE did not comply
nationwide tender offer without affecting any Minnesota shareholders, see infra text accompanying notes 42-44, the
amendments empower the Minnesota Commissioner of Commerce to suspend a tender offer pending a hearing that he or
she has discretion to call, a flaw which, after the MITE decision, is unconstitutional and one that the Ohio Act avoids. See
infra text accompanying notes 78-80. Nevertheless, the new Minnesota Take-Over Act passed constitutional muster in
Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1984).
7. OHto REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Page Supp. 1983).
8. The Ohio Control Share Acquisition Act was adopted as part of the amendments to the General Corporation Law
of Ohio to provide a procedure for shareholder review of proposed control share acquisitions. Act of Nov. 19, 1982, H.R.
Bill No. 822, 114 Gen'l Ass'y, 1983 Ohio Legis. Bull. I (Anderson).
9. However, the constitutionality of the Minnesota Corporation Act Amendments (see supra note 6) is being
contested in Educata Corp. v. Scientific Computers, Inc., No. 4-84968, a case pending before the United States District
Court, Fourth Division, of Minnesota. The Minnesota Commissioner of Commerce, pursuant to MINN. STAT. § 80B.04
subd. 4 (West Supp. 1984), suspended the tender offer Educata was making for Scientific Computers' shares. Scientific is
alleging that Educata violated H 13(d), 14(d), and 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as well as the Minnesota
Corporate Take-Overs Act, MINN. STAT. ch. 80B (West Supp. 1984), and the Minnesota Business Corporation Act,
M[NN. STAT. §§ 302A.011 subd. 37-39, 302A.449 subd. 7, 302A.671 (West Special Pamphlet 1985). Educata contends
that the above-cited sections of the Minnesota Business Corporation Act and the Minnesota Corporate Take-Overs Act are
unconstitutional as applied to its tender offer and are preempted by the Williams Act.
10. Ohio's Control Share Acquisition Act applies to all transactions involving large blocks of stock, and its effects
go far beyond its impact on takeover bids. See Kreider, Fortress Without Foundation? Ohio Takeover Act 11, 52 U. CIN.
L. REV. 108, 116-19 (1983). The purpose of this Note, however, is to analyze the Act's impact on tender offers and to
evaluate its constitutionality.
11. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
12. Id. at 627.
13. Id. at 642.
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1984).
15. The Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §H 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982), added § 13(d)-(e) and 14(d)-(f) to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982). Section 14(d)(l) requires an offeror seeking to acquire
more than five percent of any class of equity security by means of a tender offer to first file a Schedule 14D-1 with the
SEC. The Schedule requires disclosure of (1) the source of funds used to purchase the target shares, (2) past transactions
with the target company, and (3) other material financial information about the offeror. The rules promulgated by the SEC
under Section 14(d) also have substantive requirements regarding tender offers. See 17 C.F.R. §H 240.14d-1 to d-100
(1984).
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with the requirements of the Illinois Business Take-Over Act. 16 Instead, it simul-
taneously filed an action in the Northern District of Illinois seeking a declaratory




Only three Justices,' s in an opinion by Justice White, held that the Illinois
Business Take-Over Act was preempted by the Williams Act. ' 9 Because MITE did
not allege that compliance with the Illinois Act and the Securities Exchange Act of
193420 would be impossible, 2 ' the Court limited its analysis of the preemption issue
to a determination whether the Illinois Act was an obstacle to the accomplishment of
Congress' full purposes and objectives. 22 Noting that section 28(a) of the 1934 Act z3
reflected a congressional intent not to prohibit state regulation in the securities area,
the plurality acknowledged that states are not prohibited from regulating takeovers.
24
Nevertheless, three Justices found that the Illinois Act substantially obstructed the
objectives of the Williams Act.25
Justice White's opinion stressed that Congress, in passing the Williams Act,
intended to enact a regulatory scheme that would provide protection to investors
while embracing a policy of neutrality toward both the management of the target
company and the persons making the takeover bids. Justice White agreed with the
Seventh Circuit's holding in MITE Corp. v. Dixon2 6 that the objectives of Congress
were thwarted by the Illinois Act's twenty-day precommencement notification
requirement, potential for extended delay in the takeover process, and allowance for a




A majority of five Justices, 28 in an opinion by Justice White, held that the
16. The Illinois Act required any takeover offer for shares of a target company meeting Illinois' jurisdictional
requirements, see infra text accompanying note 42, to be registered with the Illinois Secretary of State. Public Act
80-1421, § 4, 1978 111. Laws 1581, 1584-1586, repealed by Act of Sept. 14, 1983, Public Act 83-365, 1983 111. Legis.
Serv. 2628.
17. MITE also sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting the
Illinois Secretary of State from enforcing the Illinois Act. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 628 (1982).
18. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined in Justice White's opinion concerning the preemption of the
Illinois statute by the Williams Act. It should be noted, however, that Justice O'Connor, having held that the Illinois
statute violated the commerce clause, found it unnecessary to reach the preemption issue, and that Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Rehnquist found the case to be moot and did not reach the merits.
19. 457 U.S. 624, 634 (1982).
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
21. 457 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1982) (applying test of Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
142-43 (1963)).
22. Id.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982).
24. 457 U.S. 624, 631 (1982).
25. Id. at 633.
26. 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980).
27. Id. at 498; see 457 U.S. 624, 634 (1982).
28. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor joined in Justice White's opinion concerning
the unconstitutionality of the Illinois statute as an indirect burden on interstate commerce. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Rehnquist, finding the case to be moot, did not reach the merits.
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Illinois Business Take-Over Act placed an unconstitutional indirect burden on inter-
state commerce. The Court began its analysis by noting that "[n]ot every exercise of
state power with some impact on interstate commerce is invalid."-29 Under the
balancing test of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.30 a state statute will be upheld if it
"regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its
effects on interstate commerce are only incidental ... unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."
31
Initially, the Court acknowledged that Illinois had a legitimate interest in pro-
tecting Illinois investors. The Court found, however, that Illinois had "no legitimate
interest in protecting nonresident shareholders. "32 Also, Illinois' interest in protect-
ing in-state investors was partially undermined because the Illinois Act exempted
acquisitions made by corporations of their own shares, 33 thereby depriving Illinois
shareholders of protection against detrimental actions taken by the management of
target corporations. 34 Additionally, the Illinois investors arguably were adequately
protected by the Williams Act. 35 Finally, the Court found that the internal affairs
doctrine, which allows states to regulate a corporation's relationships among or
between the corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders, did not
give states the power to regulate internal affairs of out-of-state corporations and their
dealings with third parties.36
The Court then considered the burden placed on interstate commerce by the
Illinois Act.37 Under the Act, a decision by the Illinois Secretary of State that the
tender offer was not substantially fair could deprive all shareholders, in-state and
out-of-state, of the opportunity to sell their shares at a premium. 38 Thus, after balanc-
ing Illinois' slight interest in protecting its shareholders against the significant impact
that the Illinois Act could have on interstate commerce, the Court held that the Act
placed an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. 3
9
2. Direct Burden
Four of the five Justices40 who held that the Illinois Business Take-Over Act
placed an unconstitutional indirect burden on interstate commerce also found the Act
directly violative of the commerce clause because it regulated transactions taking
place across state lines.'" These four Justices concluded that the Illinois law directly
29. 457 U.S. 624, 640 (1982).
30. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
31. Id. at 142.
32. 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982).
33. Id.
34. The target company in a tender offer is the corporation the securities of which are the subject of the tender offer.
35. 457 U.S. 624, 644-45 (1982).
36. Id. at 645-46.
37. Id. at 646.
38. Id. at 643.
39. Id. at 646.
40. Chief Justice Burger and Justices O'Connor and Stevens joined in Justice White's opinion concerning the
unconstitutionality of the Illinois statute as a direct burden on interstate commerce. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Rehnquist, finding the case to be moot, did not reach the merits.
41. 457 U.S. 624, 641 (1982).
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regulated interstate commerce because the Illinois law could have prevented MITE
from making its offer and concluding its transactions not only in Illinois and with
Illinois shareholders, but with all Chicago Rivet shareholders, seventy-three percent
of whom were not residents of Illinois. 4' Furthermore, the Act applied to any target
corporation meeting two of the three following conditions: (1) having its principal
executive office in Illinois; (2) being incorporated in Illinois; and (3) having at least
ten percent of its stated capital and paid-in surplus within Illinois. 43 Therefore, the
Act potentially could be applied to regulate a tender offer "that would not affect a
single Illinois shareholder."-
4 4
III. THE OHIO CONTROL SHARE ACQUISITION Acr: WHAT'S NEW?
Ohio was the first state to pass legislation intended to avoid the Supreme Court's
holding in MITE.45 Without repealing the Ohio Takeover Act,46 the General Assem-
bly of Ohio in November 1982 enacted the Ohio Control Share Acquisition Act.
47
The Act amended the General Corporation Law48 in order "to provide a mechanism
for shareholder review of proposed control share acquisitions. "
49
A. Scope
The Act applies to control share acquisitions of stock of "issuing public
corporations. ° Issuing public corporations are defined as those corporations (1)
incorporated in Ohio; (2) having fifty or more shareholders; (3) having either princi-
pal place of business, principal executive office, or substantial assets in Ohio; and (4)
having no valid close corporation agreement in existence. 5 1 A corporation coming
within the definition of issuing public corporation may opt out of the Act's purview
by so providing in its articles or regulations.
52
"Control share acquisitions' 53 are defined to include not only hostile or friendly
tender offers, but all open market purchases and privately negotiated block transac-
tions that would result in the acquiring party possessing voting power, alone or with
others, over stock in any one of three zones of control.5 4 The three zones are (1)
42. Id.
43. The Illinois Business Take-Over Act, Public Act 80-1421. § 2.10, 1978 Ill. Laws 1581, 1583-1584, repealed
by Act of Sept. 14, 1983, Public Act 83-365, 1983 Ill. Legis. Serv. 2628.
44. 457 U.S 624, 642 (1982).
45. Since November 1982, at least seven states have enacted legislation directed at regulating takeovers. See supra
note 6.
46. OHto REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (Page Supp. 1983). After Congress' passage of the Williams Act in 1968,
Ohio was one of the first states to enact a takeover law providing for administrative review of the offeror's disclosure
materials, and further providing that review procedures could be waived by the board of directors of the issuer. In 1969,
§ 1701.041 was enacted as part of Ohio's securities laws to be administered by the Division of Securities of the
Department of Commerce. Kreider, supra note 10, at 110.
47. Olto REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Page Supp. 1983).
48. OHiO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.01-.99 (Page 1978 & Supp. 1983).
49. Act of Nov. 19, 1982, H.R. Bill No. 822, 114 Gen'l Ass'y, 1983 Ohio Legis. Bull. I (Anderson).
50. Oftto REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.831(A) (Page Supp. 1983).
51. Id. § 1701.01(Y).
52. Id. § 1701.831(A).
53. Id. § 1701.01(Z).
54. Kreider, supra note 10, at 112.
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one-fifth to one-third, (2) one-third to one-half, and (3) more than one-half of the
voting power.55 Before an acquiring person moves into a zone of control, whether it
be by an initial acquisition of more than twenty percent of the shares or a move from
one control zone to another, shareholder approval must be obtained pursuant to the
statute.
56
The Act exempts acquisitions that occurred prior to its effective date, acquisi-
tions that occur pursuant to the laws of descent and distribution or pursuant to the
satisfaction of a pledge or other security interest, and acquisitions occurring pursuant
to a statutory merger or consolidation. 57 In addition, shareholders who properly
acquire a control share block by gaining shareholder authorization or who effect an
exempt acquisition may freely transfer the control block to another unless this transfer
would entitle the transferee to exercise voting power of a range different from that of
the transferor. 58 This form of exemption, however, is available only to the original
transferor; 59 the recipient must have a separate exemption or obtain shareholder
approval before reselling the control block.
B. Requirements
Any person, group, or corporation that proposes to make a control share acquisi-
tion must obtain shareholder approval. 60 To obtain the requisite approval, the
offeror 61 must deliver an Acquiring Person Statement 62 to the management of the
target corporation. 63 This statement must set forth: (1) the identity of the acquiring
person; (2) a statement that it is the Acquiring Person Statement; (3) the number of
shares of the issuing public corporation directly or indirectly owned by the acquiring
person; (4) the range of voting power under which the proposed control share acquisi-
tion would fall; (5) a description of the terms of the proposed acquisition; and (6)
representations that the acquisition is legal and the acquiring person has the financial
capacity to make the proposed acquisition. 64
Within ten days of receiving an Acquiring Person Statement, the issuing public
55. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.01(Z)(1)(a)-(c) (Page Supp. 1983).
56. Id. § 1701.831.
57. Id. § 1701.01(Z)(2)(a)-(e).
58. A person owning a block of shares controlling twenty-five percent of a company prior to November 18,
1982 could sell the block as augmented up to thirty-three and one-third percent to a buyer without statutory
approval unless the transaction caused the recipient to own over one-third of the voting power.
However... the buyer would be forced to either engage in a transaction subject to the delays and uncertainties
of the approval process or to divide the block so that no transferee would hold twenty percent or more of the
issuer.
Kreider, supra note 10, at 114.
59. Id.
60. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.831(A) (Page Supp. 1983).
61. For purposes of this Note, the acquiring person will be the tender offeror in a takeover bid. The tender offeror is
the soliciting company, individual, or group seeking to acquire the securities of the target company. See supra note 34.
62. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.01(BB) (Page Supp. 1983).
63. Id. § 1701.831(B).
64. Id. § 1701.831(B)(l)-(6).
This portion of the statute would require, for example, that a New York resident desiring to purchase twenty-one
percent of the stock of an Ohio-based corporation from a California resident in a private transaction would give
to the Ohio corporation details of the proposed transaction including a balance sheet to show financial capacity.
Kreider, supra note 10, at 113.
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corporation 65 must call a special shareholders meeting for the purpose of voting on
the proposed acquisition. This meeting must take place within fifty days of receipt of
the statement. 66 All shareholders, regardless of their voting rights, must receive
prompt notice accompanied by a copy of the Acquiring Person Statement. In addi-
tion, they must receive a statement by the target company of its position or
recommendation on the proposed transaction, or a statement that it is taking no
position and its reasons therefore.
67
C. Application
The offeror obtains the requisite shareholder approval if a quorum is present at
the meeting of shareholders called to vote on the proposed control share acquisition,
and if both a majority of the voting power of the shares represented in person or by
proxy and a majority of the voting power of the disinterested shares vote in favor the
proposed acquisition.68 The quorum requirement is met when at least a majority of
the shares entitled to vote in the election of directors and a majority of the dis-
interested shares is represented at the meeting in person or by proxy. 6 9 A disinterested
majority excludes votes on shares owned or controlled by the offeror, and votes by
officers and directors who are also employees of the target company. 70 The acquiring
person then has one year in which to consummate the approved control share
acquisition.7
1
IV. THE ILLINOIS BusINEss TAKE-OVER ACT DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN MITE
The Illinois Business Take-Over Act 72 declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court in MITE purported to regulate all takeover offers of target companies. The Act
defined a "take-over offer" as an offer to acquire any equity security of a target
company if, after the acquisition, the offeror would be the beneficial owner of more
than five percent of any class of equity security of the target corporation.73 The Act
exempted from its coverage offers made by an issuer to purchase its own shares of
stock. Also excluded were offers that Illinois' Secretary of State determined did not
require regulation under the statute for the protection of Illinois shareholders of the
65. For purposes of this Note, the issuing public corporation will be the target in a takeover bid. See supra notes 34
and 61.
66. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831(C) (Page Supp. 1983).
67. Id. § 1701.831(D).
68. Id. § 1701.831(E)(1).
69. Id.
70. "Interested shares" means the shares of an issuing public corporation in respect of which any of the
following persons may exercise or direct the exercise of the voting power of the corporation in the election of
directors: (1) An acquiring person; (2) Any officer of the issuing public corporation elected or appointed by the
directors of the issuing public corporation; (3) Any employee of the issuing public corporation who is also a
director of such corporation.
Id. § 1701.01(CC).
71. Id. § 1701.831(E)(2).
72. Public Act 80-1421, 1978 Ill. Laws 1581, repealed by Act of Sept. 14, 1983, Public Act 83-365, 1983 11.
Legis. Serv. 2628.
73. Id. at 1583.
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target company and did not have the effect of changing or influencing the control of
the target company.
74
The target companies coming under the protective umbrella of the Act were
those corporations in which Illinois shareholders owned ten percent of any class of
equity securities or those meeting any two of the following three conditions: (1)
having principal executive offices in Illinois; (2) being incorporated in Illinois; and
(3) having at least ten percent of their stated capital and paid-in surplus within
Illinois.75
The offeror was required to file a detailed registration statement with the Secre-
tary of State before making the tender offer. 7 6 The takeover offer became effective
automatically unless the Secretary called a hearing prior to twenty business days after
the date the registration statement was filed.77 A hearing could be called if the
Secretary determined it necessary for the protection of offerees, if a majority of the
outside directors of the target company so requested, or if Illinois shareholders
owning ten percent of a class of equity securities so requested. 78 The Secretary could
indefinitely postpone commencement of the hearing for the convenience of the parties
or for the protection of the Illinois offerees. 79
The Secretary had authority to deny registration of the takeover offer or to
condition registration upon certain changes or modifications if he or she found that:
(1) the takeover offer failed to provide full and fair disclosure of all material informa-
tion concerning the offer; (2) the offer was inequitable or would work a fraud or
deceit upon the offerees; (3) the offer would not be made to all offerees in Illinois on
substantially equal terms; or (4) the offer would violate the Illinois Business Take-
Over Act. 80 Thus, the Secretary of State was given broad powers to adjudicate the
substantive fairness of the takeover offer.
V. THE PREEMPTION ISSUE
Prior to MITE, several courts 8' held that state takeover statutes not unlike the
Illinois Act were in violation of the supremacy clause. 82 These courts reasoned that
the Williams Act preempted state regulation of securities transactions. Assuming
arguendo the continuing vitality of these cases, a review of the Williams Act, the
holdings of the cases, and the Ohio Control Share Acquisition Act demonstrate the
constitutionality of the new Ohio Act.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1584.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1586.
78. Id. at 1587.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See. e.g., National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982); Kennecott Corp. v. Smith,
637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1982); Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978). rer'don other grounds
sub. nor. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Empire, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 524 F. Supp. 898 (W.D. Mo.
1981); Natomas Co. v. Bryan, 512 F. Supp. 191 (D. Nev. 1981); Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1981);
Canadian Pac. Enter. (U.S.), Inc. v. Krouse, 506 F. Supp. 1192 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
82. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2.
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A. The Williams Act
The Williams Act,8 3 a series of amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, was enacted in 1968 to close a gap in investor protection under the federal
securities laws. This gap had been created by the increased use of cash tender offers
to gain control of publicly owned corporations. 84 Prior to the passage of the Williams
Act only takeover offers involving the exchange of stock were within the protective
realm of the federal securities laws. Consequently, cash tender offers increasingly
were used as a method of secretly acquiring control of publicly held corporations.
8 5
The disclosure required by the offeror was minimal, including only the identity of the
security to be tendered, the amount offered per share, the minimum number of shares
required to obligate the offeror, the tender period, and the name and address of the
depository, which was usually a bank. Importantly, disclosure of the tender offeror's
identity or plans regarding the target company was not required.8 6
In Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries87 the Supreme Court held that Congress' sole
purpose in enacting the Williams Act was to protect investors confronted with a
tender offer.88 Congress viewed the Act as necessary to protect shareholders of target
companies from takeover bidders who often operated covertly. 89 Congress, however,
also recognized that takeover bids could serve the useful and sometimes necessary
purpose of providing a check on entrenched, inefficient management. 90 The Act,
therefore, was not aimed at obstructing or unduly impeding cash takeover bids, but
was intended to provide investors faced with a cash tender offer with the information
they needed to make an informed investment decision about whether to retain or sell
the security.
9 1
The legislation was intended to "balance the scales equally to protect the legiti-
mate interests of the corporation, management, and shareholders without unduly
impeding cash takeover bids." 92 The Act seeks to maintain this balance by requiring
the tender offeror to disclose certain material facts including the tender offeror's
83. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982).
84. 113 CONG. REC. S854 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).
85. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1563 (5th ed. unabr. 1980).
86. Note, Securities Law and the Constitution: State Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered, 88 YALE L.J. 510, 512
(1979).
87. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
88. Id. at 28.
89. Today, there are those individuals in our financial community who seek to reduce our proudest businesses
into nothing but corporate shells. They seize control of the corporation with unknown sources, sell or trade away
the best assets, and later split up the remains among themselves. The tragedy of such collusion is that the
corporation can be financially raped without management orshareholders having any knowledge of the acquisi-
tions .... The corporate raider may thus act under a cloak of secrecy while obtaining the shares needed to put
him on the road to a successful capture of the company.
113 CONG. REC. S857-58 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1967) (statement of Sen. Kuchel) (emphasis added); see also Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 28 (1977).
90. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811, 2813
[hereinafter. cited as H.R. REP. No. 1711].
91. "The purpose of this bill is to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of stockholders while at the same
time providing the offeror and management equal opportunity to fairly present their case." 113 CONG. REC. S854-55
(daily ed. Jan. 18, 1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).
92. Id. at S854.
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identity, background, and plans regarding the target corporation. 93 The Act further
protects this balance by requiring disclosure of material information regarding re-
purchases of stock by a corporation.
94
The SEC has promulgated regulations to effectuate the Williams Act. 95 Those
regulations specifically covering tender offers, promulgated under section 14(d), 96
can be divided into four categories: (1) filing requirements; (2) dissemination pro-
visions; (3) disclosure requirements; and (4) substantive provisions. 97 Rule 14d-
2(b),9 8 which contains elements from each of these four categories, has been a
principal source of preemption litigation. The rule requires an offeror to commence or
withdraw the tender offer within five business days of the first public announcement
of the tender offer.99 Compliance with the precommencement registration require-
ments of a state takeover statute, such as the Illinois Business Take-Over Act or a
similar statute,' 00 suffices to trigger the commencement of a tender offer under Rule
14d-2(b). Although the filing of state precommencement materials starts the tender
offer for purposes of Rule 14d-2(b), a number of state statutes do not permit the offer
to commence until the conclusion of an applicable waiting period and hearing pro-
cess. 1O Thus, a conflict exists between Rule 14d-2(b) and state takeover statutes that
require more than a five day precommencement registration filing. 0 2
Some states have avoided this seemingly direct conflict by amending their
statutes to require a filing with their state officer up to five days before or on the date
of commencement of the tender offer.'0 3 After the 1980 enactment of Rule 14d-2(b),
several courts held precommencement provisions of takeover statutes that were more
than five days in length to be preempted. 10 4 in 1982 the District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio held in Canadian Pacific Enterprises (U.S.), Inc. v.
Krouse'0 5 that Rule 14d-2(b) preempted the provision in the Ohio Takeover Act 0 6
93. H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 90, at 2814.
94. Id. at 2814-15; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1982). One weakness the Supreme Court found in Illinois'
"investor protection" argument was that the Illinois statute exempted a corporation from complying with the disclosure
requirements when purchasing its own stock. See supra text accompanying note 33-34.
95. Regulation 14D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-I to d-9 (1984).
96. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982).
97. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,373, at 82,579 (Dec. 19. 1979).
98. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1984).
99. Id.
100. IDAHO CODE § 30-1503 (Supp. 1984); MiCH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 451.905 (West Supp. 1984-1985); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 409.515(1) (Vernon 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:5-3(a) (West Supp. 1984-1985); VA. CODE § 13.1-531
(Supp. 1984).
101. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,373, at 82.584 (Dec. 19, 1979).
102. The SEC acknowledged that its adoption of Rule 14d-2(b) appeared to produce a conflict with state pre-
commencement waiting period provisions that is "so direct and substantial as to make it impossible to comply with both
sets of requirements as they presently exist." SEC Release No. 34-16,384, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) 82,373, at 82,584 (Dec. 19, 1979), quoted in Sargent, On the Validity of State Takeover Regulation: State
Responses to MITE and Kidwell, 42 Onto ST. L.J. 689, 696 (1981).
103. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-3.1 to .3 (West Supp. 1984-1985); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. I 10C, § 2 (Michie/
Law. Co-op Supp. 1984); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1602 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 435
(West Supp. 1984-1985).
104. See, e.g., Empire, Inc. v. Asheroft, 524 F. Supp. 898, 904 (W.D. Mo. 1981); Natomas Co. v. Bryan, 512 F.
Supp. 191, 193 (D. Nev. 1981); Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp. 782, 786 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Kennecott Corp. v. Smith.
507 F. Supp. 1206, 1219 (D.N.J. 1981).
105. 506 F. Supp. 1192 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
106. Oito REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (Page Supp. 1983).
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requiring public announcement of a proposed takeover bid at least twenty days before
it was made. 10 7 Less than two years earlier the same court, in AMCA International
Corp. v. Krouse,10 8 had upheld the constitutionality of the same provision in the Ohio
Takeover Act.' 0 9 In AMCA International, however, Judge Kinneary had noted that
his decision antedated the SEC's adoption of Rule 14d-2(b) and that the Ohio Act
would indisputably be preempted when the new rule became effective. "o
Some courts have upheld the validity of state takeover statutes notwithstanding a
difference between the state and federal filing requirements."' These courts recon-
cile the operation of the federal and state statutory schemes by superimposing them.
Because the state statutes have the same objective as the Williams Act-investor
protection-a state takeover statute is not preempted merely because its provisions
are different from those chosen by Congress.1
1 2
B. Preemption Cases
In enacting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Congress explicitly chose not
to preclude state legislation regarding the exchange of securities. 3 The language of
section 28(a) is straightforward: "Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction
of the securities commission (or any agency or officer performing like functions) of
any State over any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the
provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder." '4
"Thomas Corcoran, a principal draftsman of the 1934 Act, indicated to Con-
gress that the purpose of section 28(a) was to leave the states with as much leeway to
regulate securities transactions as the Supremacy Clause would allow them in the
absence of such a provision."" 5 Section 28(a) was intended to protect, not limit,
state authority." 16
Congress, when it so chooses, may preempt a field or enact a scheme of federal
regulation which is so pervasive that an intent to preempt can be inferred.' " State
regulation of securities also is preempted if it directly or indirectly conflicts with
federal law by obstructing the accomplishment of Congress' full purposes and
objectives.' 18
The courts that, prior to MITE, held state takeover statutes preempted by the
Williams Act found that the state statutes interfered with what has been termed the
107. 506 F. Supp. 1192, 1204 (S.D. Ohio 1981). "we find that the SEC adopted its preemptive rule with deliberate
and rationally justifiable purpose to accomplish a permissible regulatory objective." Id. at 1203.
108. 482 F. Supp. 929 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 933, 934 n.4.
IIl. See, e.g., \Vylain, Inc. v. TRE Corp., 412 A.2d 338 (Del. Ch. 1980); Unitrode Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
Am., 379 Mass. 487, 491, 399 N.E.2d 5, 7 (1980).
112. City Investing Co. v. Simcox, 633 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1980); see also Unitrode Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
Am., 379 Mass. 487, 491, 399 N.E.2d 5, 7 (1980); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Whaland, 121 N.H. 607, 433 A.2d 1250
(1981).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982).
114. Id.
115. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 182 n.13 (1979).
116. Id. at 182.
117. Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947).
118. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
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Williams Act's "market approach" to investor protection. 119 According to the mar-
ket approach theory, the function of federal regulation is to maintain a free flow of
information between the tender offeror and the target so that shareholders can be
informed enough to make their own knowledgeable and unfettered choices about
whether to relinquish their shares for a cash premium. 120 According to the theory,
when the commencement of an offer is delayed "the market approach cannot be
effectuated, because the choice can no longer be an informed one." 12 1
In Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 122 the first case in which a federal
court ruled on the constitutionality of a state takeover law, the Fifth Circuit held that
the Idaho takeover statute123 was preempted. The court found Idaho's fiduciary
approach to investor protection incompatible with the market approach established by
Congress. 124
In Kennecott Corp. v. Smith125 the Third Circuit held that provisions of the New
Jersey Corporation Takeover Bid Disclosure Law 126 conflicted with the SEC regula-
tions promulgated under the Williams Act and thus were preempted. 127 The pro-
visions were found to "prevent prompt disclosure of crucial information to the
shareholders, and, through delay, to shift the advantage in this struggle to incumbent
management.' 128 The court held that this effect was inimical to the federal policy
requiring prompt dissemination of all material information after the first public an-
nouncement. 
129
The Eighth Circuit endorsed this reasoning in National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC
Corp.'3 and struck down provisions of the Missouri Takeover Bid Disclosure Act 131
that required substantially more disclosure than the Williams Act. Among the
objectionable sections was an open-ended disclosure provision that gave the Com-
missioner of Securities the ability to request as much additional information as he or
she deemed necessary to protect the public. 132 Finding that "disclosure of a mass of
irrelevant data can confuse the investor and obscure relevant disclosures," 133 causing
119. See generally Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation
of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEx. L. REv. 1, 1-46 (1978). Congress reaffirmed its choice of a market approach to investor
protection in the tender offer area in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18(a)
(1982).
120. Kennecott v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 187-88 (3d Cir. 1980).
121. Id. at 189.
122. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S.
173 (1979).
123. IDAHO CODE § 30-1501(5)(e) (1980).
124. "Instead of relying upon investors' decisions after full disclosure, Idaho relies upon the business judgment of
corporate directors with a fiduciary duty to their shareholders. Idaho's 'fiduciary approach' to investor protection may be
one way to protect shareholders, but it is an approach Congress rejected." Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d
1256, 1279 (5th Cir. 1978) (emphasis added in original), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United
Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
125. 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980).
126. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:5-3(a) (West Supp. 1984-1985).
127. 637 F.2d 181, 191 (3d Cir. 1980).
128. Id. at 187.
129. Id. at 188; see Rule 14d-2(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1984).
130. 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982).
131. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 409.515 (Vernon 1979).
132. 687 F.2d 1122, 1131 (8th Cir. 1982).
133. Id. (quoting Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1280 (1978)).
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"more harm than good," 1 34 the court ruled that these disclosure requirements con-
flicted "with the Williams Act's goal of unfettered choice by well-informed in-
vestors."
1 35
In National City Lines the Eighth Circuit also held that the Missouri Act's
twenty day precommencement requirement and opportunity for a hearing upset the
congressionally designed balance by creating delay between the commencement and
consummation of a tender offer.' 36 Because management of the target company could
use the time during which the hearings were underway and the tender offer was
suspended to formulate its defense, the court found the delay to be inconsistent with
the scheme of the Williams Act. 137 Further, the court found that the Missouri Act's
substantive requirements 138 conflicted with the SEC rules 13 9 regulating tender offers.
Finally, the court held that the Missouri Act impermissibly discriminated against
nonapproved tender offers by exempting from regulation offers that were approved
by the target company's board of directors.
140
The Delaware Tender Offers Act was also found to be rife with provisions
conflicting with the Williams Act in Dart Industries, Inc. v. Conrad. 141 In Dart the
court specifically objected to the delay injected into the tender offer procedure by the
Delaware Act. The court described delay as the single most effective weapon a target
company could utilize to defeat a tender offer.' 42 The court also faulted the pro-
visions that discriminated against the original offerors in favor of subsequent offer-
ors. The Delaware Act mandated that the original offeror comply with a requisite
waiting period before commencing the tender offer. However, it allowed subsequent
or competing offerors to purchase securities tendered pursuant to their competing
offers at the same time the original offeror was permitted to purchase them, without
complying with a waiting period requirement.
143
Since MITE, only one circuit addressing the constitutionality of state takeover
statutes has based its decision directly on preemption grounds. 144 Other courts have
only tangentially addressed the issue, intimating what they might hold in the
future. 145 In Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly,14 6 decided less than two months
after MITE, the First Circuit held that a one-year ban, imposed pursuant to the
Massachusetts takeover statute, 147 on a takeover bidder's subsequent purchases of a
134. Id. (quoting TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448 (1976)).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1130.
137. Id. Departure from neutrality is one of the principal grounds for arguing that State statutes are preempted by the
Williams Act. See also Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1278 (5th Cir. 1978). rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
138. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 409.505(3)(d) (Vernon 1979).
139. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-1 to -100 (1984).
140. 687 F.2d 1122, 1132 (8th Cir. 1982).
141. 462 F. Supp. 1, 13 (S.D. Ind. 1978).
142. Id. at II.
143. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(b)(2) (1983).
144. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, 686 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982).
145. North Star Int'l v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1983); Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp.,
717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1983).
146. 686 F.2d 1029 (Ist Cir. 1982).
147. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. IIOC, § 1-13 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984).
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target company's securities was not preempted by the Williams Act. 14 8 The First
Circuit found that the Supreme Court cases of the last decade evidenced "a new
solicitude toward state interests and an elevation of the threshold of conflict required
before a state statute" will be declared unconstitutional. 149
In Edgar v. MITE Corp. 150 only three Justices found provisions of the Illinois
Business Take-Over Act preempted.' 5 1 MITE therefore cannot stand for a broad
preemption principle under which any state regulation of tender offers must be in-
validated. 152 Indeed, MITE renders the holdings of the pre-MITE preemption cases
suspect.
The Williams Act is essentially a disclosure statute. It does not attempt to deal
with all aspects of a tender offer, nor does it depend on exclusivity for the effective
protection of shareholders. 153 While state standards are frequently more stringent
than the federal standards, it is possible to comply with both. 154 To properly approach
preemption cases, courts should attempt to reconcile the operation of both the state
and federal laws so as to avoid complete invalidation of the state law. 15
5
In the above cases the state statutes were preempted because they obstructed
Congress' objective of providing a market approach to investor protection. 156 It
should follow, then, that if a state statute does not operate to block or even delay the
free flow of information, but effectuates such flow, it does not block the accomplish-
ment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress and, hence, is not preempted.
C. Preemption and the New Ohio Act
The Ohio Control Share Acquisition Act does not obstruct the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes of Congress. It, like the Williams Act, ensures that
full information is conveyed as soon as possible to the shareholders of a target
company so they may exercise an informed investment decision, and does not tip the
scales in favor of either the tender offeror or the target management.
Unlike the Illinois Business Take-Over Act, which was part of the Illinois
Securities Law, the Ohio Control Share Acquisition Act is part of the General
Corporation Law of Ohio157 and applies to all acquisitions of significant amounts of
stock of Ohio corporations meeting certain jurisdictional requirements.' 5 8 Thus,
148. 686 F.2d 1029, 1038-39 (1st Cir. 1982). The court found that the delay was not inconsistent with the Williams
Act's policy of investor protection when the delay was easily avoided by compliance with the statute.
149. Id. at 1037-38; see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
150. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
151. White, I., writing for the plurality; Burger, C.J.; and Blackmun, J. But see supra note 18.
152. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, 686 F.2d 1029, 1036 (Ist Cir. 1982).
153. See Note, supra note 86, at 519-20.
154. id.
155. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, 686 F.2d 1029, 1036 (Ist Cir. 1982).
156. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
157. Onto REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.01-.99 (Page 1978 & Supp. 1983). A state's general corporation law is global
in nature and governs the internal operations of the companies incorporated within the state. In contrast, a state's securities
laws, or blue sky laws, are territorial in nature, covering only offers, purchases, and sales which are to some substantial
extent made in or from the state. Residence, domicile of participants, and place of organization of the issuer are usually
immaterial to the operations of state securities laws. Shipman, Some Thoughts About the Role of State Takeover Legisla-
tion: The Ohio Takeover Act, 21 CASE W. RES. 722, 740 (1970); see supra text accompanying note 48.
158. Onto REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.01(Y) (Page Supp. 1983); see supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
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rather than regulating sales of securities as the Illinois Act did, the Ohio Act merely
regulates the internal affairs of corporations. Its only disclosure requirement is that
the offeror file a statement with the target corporation, which must be an Ohio
corporation. 159 In contrast, the Illinois Act ostensibly could have been applied when
the target corporation was incorporated outside Illinois and had its principal executive
office and ten percent of its stated capital and paid-in surplus in Illinois-regardless
of whether any Illinois residents were shareholders. 160 The Illinois Act also required
the offeror to make filings with the Illinois Secretary of State as well as with the target
corporation.' 61 Under the Ohio Act, an offeror is only required to file an Acquiring
Person Statement with the target company. 162
The Ohio Control Share Acquisition Act merely requires the target company to
call a special shareholders meeting within ten days of receipt of the Acquiring Person
Statement. The shareholders must be given notice of the meeting as soon as is
reasonably possible. The notice must be accompanied by a copy of the offeror's
Acquiring Person Statement and a statement of the target company's position on the
tender offer, including an explanation of why it has taken that position.163 No provi-
sion exists which discriminates between tender offers. Accordingly, a competing
tender offer, even though approved by the target's management, could not go forward
without a shareholder vote. 64 The purpose of the Williams Act is to let tender offers
go forward for the benefit of shareholders after they receive enough information to
make an informed decision on whether or not to tender their shares; the Ohio Act
effectuates this purpose.
The disclosure requirements of the Ohio Act are not unduly burdensome or more
substantial than those of the Williams Act. 165 The requisite Acquiring Person State-
ment provides the shareholders with information concerning the acquiring person that
is essential for the shareholders to make informed decisions. i66 Substantively, the
Ohio Act does not interfere with the Williams Act. 167 The only timetables it pre-
scribes are the ten day limit by which the shareholders meeting must be called and the
fifty day limit within which the meeting must be held. The tender offer can still
commence within five days of the first public announcement pursuant to Rule 14d-
2(b). Under the Williams Act and rules promulgated thereunder 168 shareholders
tendering their shares can withdraw them any time before fifteen days and after sixty
days from the date of commencement of the offer.' 69 Therefore, the Ohio Act's
provision that conditions the offering of shares on the ultimate approval of the
159. Id.
160. PublicAct 80-1421, § 2.10, 1978 11. Laws 1581, 1583-1584, repealed by Act of Sept. 14, 1983, PublicAct
83-365, 1983 111. Legis. Serv. 2628; see supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
161. Public Act80-1421, 1978 I11. Laws 1581, 1584, repealed by Act of Sept. 14, 1983, Public Act 83-365, 1983
I11. Legis. Serv. 2628.
162. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
163. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831(D) (Page Supp. 1983); see supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
164. Contra DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(b)(91) (1979); IDAHO CODE § 30-1501(5)(e) (1980 & Supp. 1983); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 237.52-9(5) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984).
165. Contra Mo. ANN. STAT. § 409.515.2 (Vernon 1979); see supra text accompanying notes 130-32.
166. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831(B) (Page Supp. 1983); see supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
167. Contra DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(2)-(3) (1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 409.510 (Vernon 1979).
168. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982); Regulation 14D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1 to -100 (1984).
169. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a)(1) (1983).
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shareholders at a meeting called for that purpose is not in conflict with the federal
requirements. The Ohio Control Share Acquisition Act functions to complement, not
to obstruct, the Williams Act.
Under the Ohio Act the shareholders, the group meant to be protected by the
Williams Act, 170 decide the fate of a tender offer.' 71 A statutory scheme that gives
the final decision whether a tender offer can go forward to the group of people that
Congress intended to protect under the Williams Act cannot be construed as pre-
empted by the Williams Act.
VI. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE ISSUE
While the cases holding state takeover statutes unconstitutional prior to MITE
were mainly based on preemption, 172 in many cases it was also held that the state acts
violated the commerce clause.' 73 Since MITE, some courts have indicated how they
might decide the preemption issue. 74 Due to the uncertainty of the preemption
argument, however, courts confronted with the constitutionality of state takeover
statutes mainly have addressed whether the statutes violate, directly or indirectly, the
commerce clause. 175 The provisions of the Ohio Control Share Acquisition Act are
clearly distinguishable from those found violative of the commerce clause, as the
following review of cases addressing the commerce clause issue will illustrate.
A. The Commerce Clause in MITE
To avoid unconstitutionality under the Supreme Court's MITE analysis, the
Ohio Act must not directly regulate or indirectly impose burdens on interstate secur-
ities transactions that exceed the local interests served by the Act.' 76 The basis of the
Court's holding in MITE was that the burden placed on interstate commerce by the
Illinois Business Take-Over Act was not justified by the local interests it purported to
serve. 177 The Court found "the effects of allowing the Illinois Secretary of State to
block a nationwide tender offer" to be "substantial.' 178
Unlike the Illinois Act, no provision in the Ohio Act permits an agent of the
170. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
171. The Williams Act alone does not require a tender offeror to purchase any shares. It only requires that any
securities taken up shall be taken on a pro rata basis. Thus, the Act is not violated by an offeror's failure to take up any
securities at all. Profusek & Gompf, State Takeover Legislation After MITE: Standing Pat, Blue Sky. or Corporation Law
Concepts?, 7 CORP. L. REv. 3, 31 (1984).
172. See supra note 81.
173. E.g., National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 122 (Ist Cir. 1982); Great W. United Corp. v.
Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp.. 443 U.S. 173
(1979); Dart Indus. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1, 13 (S.D. Ind. 1978). But see City Investing Co. v. Simcox, 633 F.2d 56
(7th Cir. 1980); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Whaland, 121 N.H. 607, 433 A.2d 1250 (1981).
174. E.g., San Francisco Real Estate Investors v. Real Estate Inv. Trust of Am., 701 F.2d 1000, 1003 (Ist Cir.
1983); Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 1983).
175. E.g., Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1983); Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw. 547
F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Va. 1982); see also supra notes 3, 144-45 and accompanying text.
176. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (applying test of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137. 142
(1970)).
177. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 646 (1982).
178. Id. at 643.
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State of Ohio to decide the fate of a tender offer. The Ohio law only establishes a
procedural framework within which the shareholders are ensured an opportunity to
make an informed decision on whether the offer will go forward. While the hearing is
pending the conditional tender of shares can go forward without impediment or
delay. 17
9
Four Justices in MITE thought the Illinois statute directly violated the commerce
clause by regulating transactions that took place across state lines.1 80 These-Justices
perceived that the Illinois Act on its face would apply even if none of the target
company's shareholders were residents of Illinois, and thus could be applied to
regulate a tender offer that would not affect a single Illinois shareholder. They held
that because the Illinois statute could regulate commerce that had no impact upon the
state, it was an overly broad regulation of tender offers and as such was precluded by
the commerce clause.18' The Ohio Act, which only regulates control share acquisi-
tions of companies incorporated under the laws of Ohio,' 82 avoids this infirmity. It
could not be applied to commerce taking place wholly outside its borders.
In a tender offer, the interests of at least three parties-the offeror, the
shareholders and the management of the target company-conflict to some extent.
The Williams Act seeks to protect the shareholders while balancing the competing
interests of the offeror and target management. 18 3 The Ohio Control Share Acquisi-
tion Act also seeks to protect the shareholders of organizations incorporated under the
laws of Ohio and to balance the competing interests of the offeror and the target
company's management. To effectuate this purpose the Ohio Act mandates that a
special shareholders meeting be called within ten days of receipt of the Acquiring
Person Statement, which presumably will be within ten days of the first public
announcement of the tender offer. '84 Within fifty days, well within the sixty days that
a tender offer may remain open before shareholders can withdraw their shares under
the Williams Act, the shareholders will have the opportunity to cast their votes
approving or disapproving the tender offer. In that time they will have received a
copy of the Acquiring Person Statement containing all relevant and material informa-
tion pertaining to the offer, and a statement of the target management's position
regarding the offer, 185 which will enable them to make an informed decision. A
majority of all shareholders entitled to vote and a majority of disinterested
shareholders-those who vote shares that are not owned by the offeror, an officer of
the target corporation, or an employee who is a director of the target corporation-
must vote in favor of the tender offer in order for it to go forward. 18 6 The Ohio Act
does not distinguish between hostile and friendly tender offers. The shareholder vote
is mandatory; it does not hinge upon the discretion of the target's self-interested
179. See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
180. 457 U.S. 624, 641 (1982); see supra note 40.
181. 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
183. Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420, 438 (N.D. Tex. 1977), aff'd, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.
1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
184. See supra text accompanying notes 167-69.
185. Onto REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831(D)(I)-(2) (Page Supp. 1983).
186. Id. § 1701.831(E)(1).
19851
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
managemelt or of an agent of the state. Neither management nor a state official
decides whether the tender offer will go forward; the choice rests with the sharehold-
ers. Also, the shareholders may opt to remove their issuing public corporation from
the purview of the Act by amending the articles of incorporation or regulations.18 7
B. The Constitutionality of the Ohio Act
States have a valid interest in the regulation of securities, and have traditionally
regulated intrastate securities transactions. On several occasions the Supreme Court
has upheld, against commerce clause challenges, the authority of states to enact blue
sky laws.' 88 A state's regulation of securities offerings and sales is a proper exercise
of the police powers reserved and guaranteed by Congress in section 28(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.189
Through its Control Share Acquisition Act, Ohio has properly exercised its
legitimate state interest in the welfare of shareholders of Ohio corporations. Unlike
the Illinois Act in MITE or the Delaware Tender Offers Act' 90 held unconstitutional
in Dart Industries,19 1 the Ohio Act does not change the time in which non-Ohio
securities sales will occur, nor does it require the offeror to disclose any information
not already mandated by the SEC. Moreover, the Act contains no element of target
management favoritism that would rebut Ohio's legitimate intention to protect
shareholders and give them an unfettered choice as to whether or not to accept a
tender offer.
The Sixth Circuit in Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp.19 2 went beyond
MITE to hold "that to the extent state statutes confer power on state authorities to
interfere with the timing of an interstate tender offer made under the Williams Act, or
to compel the revision of the solicitation or tender offer as a condition of proceeding,
they impose an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce." 193 As noted above,
the Ohio Control Share Acquisition Act allows only the shareholders of the target
corporation-the intended beneficiaries of the protection provided by Congress in the
Williams Act-' 9 4 ultimately to interfere with a tender offer.
The Sixth Circuit in Martin-Marietta also found the extraterritorial effect of
Michigan's Take-Over Offers Act to be excessive in relation to the state interest it
advanced. 195 Unlike the Michigan Act, which empowered a state administrator to
187. Id. § 1701.831(A).
188. Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. 624. 641 (1982) (citing Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co.. 242 U.S. 539 (1917)). Caldwell v.
Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co.. 242 U.S. 568 (1917). Blue sky laws
is the popular name for state statutes providing for regulation and supervision of securities offerings and sales to protect
citizen-investors from investing in fraudulent companies. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 157 (5th ed. 1979).
189. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982); see supra text accompanying notes 113-17.
190. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1983).
191. 462 F. Supp. I (S.D. Ind. 1978).
192. 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982).
193. Id. at 565.
194. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
195. 690 F.2d 558,566 (6th Cir. 1982) (citing Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624,644 (1982) (White. J.. plurality
opinion)). "'While protecting local investors is plainly a legitimate state objective, the state has no legitimate interest in
protecting non-resident shareholders. Insofar as Illinois law burdens out-state transactions [sicl, there is nothing to be
weighed in the balance to sustain the law." Id.
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delay a tender offer indefinitely,1 96 the Ohio Act's requirement of shareholder
approval of the tender offer is properly within the ambit of internal affairs.197 The
burden imposed on interstate commerce by operation of the Ohio Act is not so great
in relation to the state interest in regulation of tender offers as to warrant a finding that
it violates the commerce clause.
The view could be taken that if the shareholders of an Ohio corporation vote
against a tender offer, the operation of the Ohio Act would stop a nationwide tender
offer and hence impermissibly regulate interstate commerce. However, the Ohio
Control Share Acquisition Act is a part of Ohio's General Corporation Law, and by
providing for a shareholder vote it operates within Ohio's scope of authority to
regulate the internal affairs of its corporations. 9 8 Ohio's authority to govern Ohio
corporations through its corporation laws is not restricted to transactions that take
place within the state. 199 When a corporation incorporates under Ohio law, it benefits
from the operation of Ohio's laws and manifests its consent to be bound by Ohio's
General Corporation Law. If an Ohio corporation prefers not to utilize the Control
Share Acquisition Act, it may exercise its option not to be bound. 200 Moreover, all
shareholders have the opportunity to vote, not just the Ohio shareholders. Thus, if a
tender offer is thwarted, it has been stopped by the decision of the corporation's
shareholders-not by operation of the Ohio Act. The Ohio Act, therefore, merely
provides a mechanism to permit the corporation's shareholders to decide the corpora-
tion's future.
It is difficult to imagine how a state could protect the interests of its corpora-
tions' investors, which Congress has specifically allowed it to do, in a less restrictive
manner. Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion in MITE,20 1 explicitly noted that
the Court's striking down of the Illinois statute as an indirect burden on interstate
commerce did not preclude a state from enacting a statute narrowly tailored to protect
the state's legitimate interests. Justice Stevens, similarly, in his concurring opinion
expressed that Congress' decision to follow a policy of neutrality in the Williams Act
is not "tantamount to a federal prohibition against state legislation designed to pro-
vide special protection for incumbent management. '202 If a narrowly tailored state
statute like the Ohio Act is held to be an impermissible burden on interstate com-
merce, it is difficult to conceive how a state legislature could enact a statute pertain-
ing to takeover offers that would be constitutional. The practical effect of such a
decision would be a de facto preemption of the ability of states to regulate tender
196. MictC. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 451.914 (Supp. 1984-1985).
197. See Shipman, supra note 157, at 740.
198. "The legitimacy of a state's interest in regulating the terms under which corporations may organize and
reorganize has long been recognized.... [Sltate law governs the internal affairs of a corporation, and the validity of such
regulation is beyond preadventure except as to circumstances in which Congress... has expressly ordained otherwise."
Profnsek & Gompf, State Takeover Legislation After MITE: Standing Pat, Blue Sky or Corporation Law Concepts?, 7
CORP. L. REv. 3, 37 (1984). "Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate
directors on the understanding that... state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation." Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 84 (1975).
199. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
200. See supra text accompanying note 52.
201. 457 U.S. 624, 646 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring).
202. Id. at 655 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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offers. This result, however, would directly contradict the concurring opinions of
Justices Powell and Stevens, which specifically reject foreclosing states from regulat-
ing tender offers. 20 3 It would also fly in the face of congressional intent as evidenced
by Congress' refusal to adopt any amendments to the Williams Act that would
prohibit state regulation of takeovers. 20 4 The Ohio Legislature, in enacting the Ohio
Control Share Acquisition Act, has acted within its powers.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Ohio Control Share Acquisition Act was drafted after the Supreme Court
decided Edgar v. MITE Corp.. The Ohio Legislature clearly attempted to provide
shareholders of target Ohio corporations with protection not provided by the Williams
Act. Congress has not expressly evidenced an intent to preempt state regulation of
tender offers, and by its actions has indicated an unwillingness to do so. The Secur-
ities Acts of 1933 and of 1934 were enacted to provide full disclosure and prevent
fraud in securities regulation and distribution, and were structured to allow con-
current regulation by states. A finding that the Ohio Act is unconstitutional would
operate to prohibit any state regulation of tender offers, hostile or friendly. This
action would be without congressional mandate and in violation of the federal scheme
of securities regulation.
Katherine B. Raup
203. "1 join Part V-B [the portion of the opinion holding the Illinois Act indirectly violates the commerce clause]
because its Commerce Clause reasoning leaves some room for state regulation of tender offers." Id. at 646 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
204. The following recommendation was made to Congress in 1976:
A majority of the Subcommittee [Subcommittee on Proxy Solicitations and Tender Offers of the Federal
Regulation of Securities Committee of the American Bar Association's Section of Corporation, Banking and
Business Law] believes federal preemption is indicated because there is a particular need for uniformity in the
area of tender offer legislation and because state laws are too pro-management.
State Takeover Statutes and the Williams Act, 32 Bus. LAW. 187, 193 (1976). In 1984 a legislative package, the Tender
Offer Reform Act of 1984, H.R. 5693, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONo. REC. H4359 (daily ed. May 22, 1984), was
presented to Congress by the SEC. The Act, which was not acted on but will be considered by the 99th Congress, is aimed
at curtailing the excesses and abuses of corporate management when defending against takeovers by eliminating "golden
parachutes," "poison pills," and "greenmail" during tender offers. According to Timothy W. Wirth, Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance of the Committee on Energy and Commerce of
the House of Representatives (which adopted the Act), the Act intended to improve the fairness of the tender offer process
by providing additional time for shareholders and corporate managers to evaluate the proposed transactions, greater
disclosure of the impact of the impending takeover, and increased shareholder participation in certain corporate transac-
tions. Letter from Timothy W. Wirth to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Rep. (Oct. 1, 1984).
That the Act was designed, in the words of John S.R. Shad, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
to "enhance shareholder protection without unduly intruding into state corporate law" (see FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
Report No. 1074 (May 30, 1984)), is a recognition of the longstanding scheme of state and federal co-regulation of tender
offers.
In opposition to the proposed Act Donald T. Regan, former Secretary of the Treasury, has expressed the Administra-
tion's belief that H.R. 5693 would "intrude unnecessarily into State law, and constitute an unwarranted step toward
imposition of a substantive federal corporation law." He has indorsed further exploration of the issues addressed by the
Act. Letter from Donald T. Regan to John D. Dingell, Chairman of the Committee on Energy and Commerce (Sept. 25,
1984).
No action was taken on H.R. 5693 in 1984 so that further hearings could be held by Congress and more of the issues
could be fully addressed. Among the questions to be considered, according to H.R. REP. No. 1028, 98th Cong., 2d Seas.
1 (1984), is the proper relationship between state and federal law in regulating the takeover process. The Report notes that
on two occasions the National Association of Attorneys General has adopted resolutions urging that state regulation in the
takeover area be recognized. Id. at 13. The resolutions are based on the premise that state regulation has been more
effective than federal regulation in providing the board of directors and shareholders of the target with adequate time,
disclosure, and power to consider all possibilities and take action that results in the most favorable outcome for the
shareholders. Id.
